We review here some recent results that show that inflationary cosmological models must contain initial singularities. We also present a new singularity theorem. The question of the initial singularity re-emerges in inflationary cosmology because inflation is known to be generically futureeternal. It is natural to ask, therefore, if inflationary models can be continued into the infinite past in a non-singular way. The results that we discuss show that the answer to the question is "no." This means that we cannot use inflation as a way of avoiding the question of the birth of the Universe. We also argue that our new theorem suggests -in a sense that we explain in the paper -that the Universe cannot be infinitely old.
I. Introduction
Inflationary cosmological models appear, at first glance, to admit the possibility that the Universe might be described by a version of the steady-state picture. The possibility seems to arise because inflation is generically future-eternal: in a large class of inflationary cosmological models the Universe consists of a number of isolated thermalized regions embedded in an always-inflating background [1] . The boundaries of the thermalized regions expand into this background, but the inflating domains that separate them expand even faster, and the thermalized regions do not, in general, merge. As previously created regions expand, new ones come into existence, but the Universe does not fill up entirely with thermalized regions [2] [3] [4] . A cosmological model in which the inflationary phase has no global end and continually produces new "islands of † Permanent address: Long Island University, Southampton, NY 11968.
* Electronic mail: borde@cosmos2.phy.tufts.edu ⋆ Electronic mail: vilenkin@cosmos2.phy.tufts.edu thermalization" naturally leads to this question: can the model be extended in a non-singular way into the infinite past, avoiding in this way the problem of the initial singularity? The Universe would then be in a steady state of eternal inflation without a beginning.
Assuming that some rather general conditions are met, we have recently shown [5] [6] [7] [8] that the answer to this question is "no": generic inflationary models necessarily contain initial singularities. This is significant, for it forces us in inflationary cosmologies (as in the standard big-bang ones) to face the question of what, if anything, came before.
This paper reviews what is known about the existence of singularities in inflationary cosmology. A partial answer to the singularity question was previously given by Vilenkin [9] who showed the necessity of a beginning in a two-dimensional spacetime and gave a plausibility argument for four dimensions. The broad question was also previously addressed by Borde [10] who sketched a general proof using the Penrose-Hawking-Geroch global techniques. We will not discuss this earlier work here, concentrating instead on more recent results.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II outlines some mathematical background (see Hawking and Ellis [11] for details). Section III describes our first theorem, applicable to open Universes with a simple causal structure. Section IV sketches how the theorem may be extended to closed Universes. Section V presents a new theorem: Here, we drop the assumption that the causal structure of the Universe is simple. Instead, we introduce a new condition, which we call the limited influence condition. We argue that this condition is likely to hold in many inflationary models. Our new theorem makes no assumptions about whether the Universe is open or closed, thus providing a unified treatment of the two cases. Section VI offers some concluding comments.
II. Mathematical Preliminaries
Spacetime is represented by a manifold M with a time-oriented [12] Lorentz metric g ab of signature (−, +, +, +). We do not assume any specific field equation for g ab . Instead, we impose an inequality on the Ricci curvature (called a convergence condition), and our conclusions are valid in any theory of gravity (such as Einstein's, with a physically reasonable source) in which such a condition is satisfied.
A curve is called causal if it is everywhere either timelike or null. The causal and chronological pasts of a point p, denoted respectively by J − (p) and I − (p), are defined as follows: fig. 1 ). These definitions of futures, pasts, and light cones can be extended from single points p to arbitrary spacetime sets in a straightforward manner.
Spacetimes in which E − (p) =İ − (p), for all points p, are called past causally simple. We tighten this definition by further requiring that E − (p) = ∅ (this rules out certain causality violations). A timelike curve is maximally extended in the past direction if it has no past endpoint. (Such a curve is often called past-inextendible.) The idea behind this is that such a curve is fully extended in the past direction, and is not merely a segment of some other curve.
We define a closed Universe as one that contains a compact, edgeless, achronal hypersurface, and an open Universe as one that contains no such surface.
The strong causality condition holds on M if there are no closed or "almostclosed" timelike or null curves through any point of M. If µ is any timelike curve in a spacetime that obeys the strong causality condition and x is any point not on µ, then there must be some neighborhood N of x that does not intersect µ. (Otherwise, µ would accumulate at x, and thereby give an almostclosed timelike curve.)
Finally, consider a congruence [13] of null geodesics with affine parameter v and tangent V a . The expansion of the geodesics may be defined as θ ≡ D a V a , where D a is the covariant derivative. The propagation equation for θ leads to this inequality:
Suppose that (i) R ab V a V b ≥ 0 for all null vectors V a (this is called the null convergence condition), (ii) the expansion, θ, is negative at some point v = v 0 on a geodesic γ, and (iii) γ is complete in the direction of increasing v (i.e., γ is defined for all v ≥ v 0 ). Then θ → −∞ along γ a finite affine parameter distance from v 0 [11, 14] .
III. Open Universes
Our first result [5, 7] applies to open, causally simple spacetimes:
Theorem 1: A spacetime M cannot be null-geodesically complete to the past if it satisfies the following conditions: A. It is past causally simple. B. It is open. C. It obeys the null convergence condition. D. It has at least one point p such that for every point q to the past of p the volume of the difference of the pasts of p and q is finite.
Assumptions A-C are conventional as far as work on singularity theorems goes. But assumption D is new and is inflation-specific. A slightly different version has been discussed in detail elsewhere [9, 7] , but here is a rough, short explanation: It may be shown that if a point r lies in a thermalized region, then all points in I + (r) also lie in that thermalized region [5] . Therefore, given a point p in the inflating region, all points in its past must lie in the inflating region. Further, it seems plausible that there is a zero probability for no thermalized regions to form in an infinite spacetime volume. Then assumption D follows.
Proof: The full proof of this result is available elsewhere [5, 7] , but here is a sketch: Suppose that M is null-complete to the past. We show that a contradiction follows.
Let q be a point to the past of the point p of assumption D. Then every past-directed null geodesic from q must leave E − (q) at some point and enter I − (q) (i.e., it must leave the past null cone of q and enter the interior of the past of q). For, let γ be a past-directed null geodesic from q, and suppose that γ lies in E − (q) throughout. Choose a small "triangle" of null geodesics neighboring γ in E − (q) and construct a volume "wedge" by moving the triangle so that its vertex moves from q to a point q ′ (still in I − (p)), an infinitesimal distance to the future of q. The volume of this region may be expressed [5, 7] as
where ∆ is a constant, A is the cross-sectional area of E − (q) in the wedge, and v is an affine parameter along the geodesic (chosen to increase in the past direction). From assumption D, this volume (being a part of the volume of I − (p) − I − (q)) must be finite. This can happen only if A decreases somewhere.
where θ is the divergence of the congruence of null geodesics that make up our volume wedge. Therefore, θ must become negative somewhere. We have seen that assumption C then implies that θ → −∞ within a finite affine parameter distance. It follows from this (by a standard argument [11] ) that γ must leave E − (q) and enter I − (q), a finite affine parameter distance from q. Now, this holds for any geodesic γ that lies in E − (q) sufficiently far to the past. Thus E − (q) is compact. But assumption A implies that E − (q) has no edge. These two statements taken together contradict assumption B.
IV. Closed Universes
Closed Universes are potentially awkward for our theorem because it is possible for light cones in some closed Universes to "wrap around" the whole Universe, and thus be compact, without causing any problems. This is illustrated in fig. 2 [15] . Such behavior is unreasonable, however, in the context of most q r Figure 2 : A closed Universe in which the past light cone of any point q is compact (and the volume of the difference of the pasts of any two points is finite). The past-directed null geodesics from q start off initially in E − (q); but, once they recross at r ("at the back") they enter I − (q) (because there are timelike curves between q and points on these null geodesics past r), and they thus leave E − (q).
inflationary cosmological models, which are "spatially large" in the sense that they contain many different regions that are not in causal communication.
We define a localized light cone as one that does not wrap around the Universe. More precisely, we say that a past light cone is localized if from every spacetime point p not on the cone there is at least one timelike curve, maximally extended in the past direction, that does not intersect the cone [16] . It turns out that the conclusion of our theorem still holds if we replace assumption B by the assumption that past light cones are localized [6] .
V. Causally Complicated Universes
The assumption of causal simplicity -made in our first result in order to simplify the proof -can be dropped, as long as we are willing to make a replacement assumption about the causal structure of inflating spacetimes. The new theorem embraces topologically and causally complicated spacetimes, and it allows us to give a unified treatment of open and closed Universes.
Theorem 2:
A spacetime M cannot be null-geodesically complete to the past if it satisfies the following conditions: A. It obeys the null convergence condition. B. It obeys the strong causality condition. C. It has at least one point p such that i. for every point q to the past of p the volume of the difference of the pasts of p and q is finite (i.e., Ω(I − (p) − I − (q)) < ∞), and ii. there is a timelike curve µ, maximally extended to the past of p, such that the boundary of the future of µ has a non-empty intersection with the past of p (i.e.,İ
Part (ii) of assumption C is new. It is related to certain other causal and topological properties of spacetimes [8] , and there are also physical reasons for believing that the assumption is reasonable. Consider, for instance, a point r in the inflating region. Suppose that its past, I
− (r), has the property that it "swallows the Universe," in the sense that every timelike curve that is maximally extended in the past direction eventually enters I − (r). (This is related to the issue of localization of light cones discussed above.) Assuming that there are thermalization events arbitrarily far in the past, it seems likely, then, that there is a thermalization event somewhere in I − (r). This contradicts the fact that r lies in the inflating region [5] . It is plausible, therefore, that inflating spacetimes will, in general, have the property that there exist maximally extended (in the past direction) timelike curves whose futures do not encompass the whole inflating region. (If no timelike curve has a future that encompasses the entire inflating region, it will guarantee that the Universe never completely thermalizes -so one may view a condition of this sort as a sufficient condition for inflation to be future-eternal.)
Another piece of evidence for the reasonableness of part (ii) of assumption C is that the spacetime in the past light cone of any point in the inflating region is locally approximately de Sitter. It is similar to the spacetime in the future light cone of a point in an inflating universe where there is no thermalization. Thus "past infinity" in inflating regions might be expected to be similar to that of de Sitter space, where the sort of behavior we are talking about does occur [11] .
We are arguing, in other words, that a typical maximally extended pastdirected curve ought not to influence the entire inflating region -there must be portions of the region that do not lie to the future of such a curve. This is illustrated in fig. 3 . Let V be a spacetime region. We call a timelike curve, µ, a curve of limited influence in V if its future does not engulf all of V. If V is the inflating region of a spacetime M, and if all timelike curves in M are of limited influence in V, we say that the spacetime obeys the limited influence condition. Proof: Suppose that M is null-complete to the past. We show that this leads to a contradiction.
Let q be a point to the past of the point p of assumption C. We have seen in Theorem 1 that every past-directed null geodesic from q must leave E − (q) at some point and enter I − (q) (i.e., it must leave the past null cone of q and enter the interior of the past of q).
Let the point q belong toİ + (µ)∩I − (p) (see fig. 4 ). Let γ be a null geodesic through q that lies onİ + (µ). From assumption B it follows that this geodesic cannot leaveİ + (µ) when followed in the past direction. For, suppose it does at some point x. This point cannot lie on µ itself (because then it, and all points to its causal future, including q, will lie to the chronological future of some point on µ, i.e., in I + (µ) and not on its boundary). Pick a neighborhood N of x that does not intersect µ anywhere (see the discussion of strong causality in Section II). There will be some null geodesic in N , past-directed from x, that lies on the boundaryİ + (µ). If this geodesic, λ, is other than the continuation of γ, there will be a timelike curve from it to a point on γ (see fig. 5 ), violating the achronal nature of the boundaryİ + (µ). and on E − (q). It must lie onİ + (µ) throughout when followed into the past (the hollow circle at the "past end" of µ is not part of the spacetime). But q ∈ I − (p), so γ must enter I − (q). This contradicts the fact that it lies onİ + (µ) throughout. Now, we have seen that γ must leave E − (q) and enter I − (q); i.e., there must be a point r to the past of q on γ such that r ∈ I − (q). This means that every point in some neighborhood of r must also lie in I − (q). Some of these points must belong to I + (µ). (The point r lies on γ, and so belongs toİ + (µ), the boundary of the future of µ. Therefore, there must be points close to r that lie in I + (µ).) This means that there is a timelike curve that starts in the past at some point on µ, passes through a point close to r, and then continues on to q. This contradicts the fact that q ∈İ + (µ).
VI. Discussion
The theorems in this paper show that inflation does not seem to remove the problem of the initial singularity (although it does move the singularity back into an indefinite past). In fact, our analysis of the assumptions of the theorems suggests that almost all points in the inflating region have a singularity somewhere in their pasts. In this sense, our results are stronger than most of the usual singularity theorems, which -in general -predict the existence of just one incomplete geodesic [17] . Indeed, Theorem 2 is even stronger than that, since it appears to suggest that the Universe cannot be infinitely old, in the sense that the inflating region of spacetime can contain no timelike curve infinitely long (in proper time) in the past direction [18] . For, suppose such a curve, µ, does exist. It seems reasonable to suppose that the null geodesics that lie on the boundary of the future of µ are also complete in the past direction [19] . If this is the case, and if µ is of limited influence in the inflating region, we arrive at the same contradiction as the one in our theorem [20] .
The existence of initial singularities in inflationary models means that we cannot use inflation as a way of avoiding the question of the birth of the Universe. The question will probably have to be answered quantum mechanically, i.e., by describing the Universe by a wave function, and not by a classical spacetime.
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